Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 7-4 – Lucas Ziller – “A Hybrid Deterrence Model for Countering China”

In this podcast episode, Lucas Ziller contends that the current US deterrence-by-denial strategy is insufficient to deter China from attempting forcible unification with Taiwan, due to its neglect of ideological and psychological drivers in the Chinese Communist Party’s decision-making calculus. He introduces a hybrid deterrence framework that integrates denial and punishment across domains, coordinated by a Joint Interagency Organization.

Keywords: deterrence, interagency, China, Taiwan, operational-level planning

Stephanie Crider (Host)

Welcome to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Joining me today is Major Lucas Ziller, author of “A Hybrid Deterrence Model for Countering China,” which you can find in the Winter 2025–26 issue of Parameters.

Ziller is an Infantry officer serving as a battalion operations officer in the 82nd Airborne Division. He has served in units within US Central Command, US Special Operations Command, and US Army Forces Command. He holds degrees from the University of Toronto, the University of Kansas, the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, and the US Army Command and General Staff College.

Welcome, Lucas.

Lucas Ziller

Thank you. Appreciate you having me. Appreciate the opportunity.

Host

I’m glad you’re here.

Your article argues that the current US deterrence-by-denial strategy suffers from critical flaws. Why does a purely military, force-centric posture fail to resonate with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) decision-making calculus?

Ziller

Appreciate that question. So, I wrote the article primarily because I felt that there was a fairly simple question that my research drove me towards. And that’s, you know, is the US trying to deter China from forced reunification with Taiwan in a way or a method that China actually makes decisions?

I think a lot of discussion about Taiwan focuses on the military capabilities of all sides. How many ships are involved? How many missiles? How many aircraft? How many troops all sides have? Those things absolutely matter. I’m not trying to argue otherwise, but deterrence isn’t just about military capability. It’s also about psychology. It’s about how a adversary perceives things like costs, risk, and opportunities at hand.

So, the more I studied both deterrence theory as well as Chinese strategic thinking, the more I felt that there was a gap between the United States deterrence approach vis-à-vis [China’s] forceful reunification with Taiwan.

I think US policymakers assume Beijing will evaluate a Taiwan contingency primarily through a rational cost-benefit calculation, but Taiwan is tied to a Chinese regime, legitimacy, nationalism, [and] Chinese Communist Party identity. Because of that, military costs alone may not have the desired deterrent effect that US policymakers are looking for. So, that led me to ask whether the American approach towards deterrence is complete. And, my conclusion wasn’t that deterrence by denial is wrong, necessarily, it’s that now, by itself, [deterrence by denial] probably isn’t enough, and that kind of drove my analysis as well as my conclusion/recommendations.

Host

Your article highlights how Beijing views Taiwan not just as a strategic interest but as a moral imperative central to regime legitimacy. How does this moralization of national interests alter China’s willingness to absorb immense material losses?

Ziller

One thing that stood out to me as I was researching the article is that not all interests are equal. Countries, whether it’s [the] United States or China, routinely negotiate over trade, resources, or territory, but when the leaders of those countries begin to frame the issues in moral terms, or historical terms, compromise between those countries becomes much more difficult. The CCP has routinely and repeatedly described reunification with Taiwan as part of, as they phrase it, a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. And, that’s a very different framing than saying it’s simply in Chinese or China’s strategic interests. That terminology and other things like it is very heavy with moral and historical connotations. So, when leaders publicly make those kinds of comments over the span of many years or, in China’s case, many decades, they create expectations within their party, the Chinese Communist Party, but [also] among the broader population.

And that, ultimately, narrows their room to maneuver or to negotiate with the United States, Taiwan, or any other player within the dynamic. We’ve seen this specific dynamic play out in the past. China accepted enormous costs during the Korean War because Beijing viewed the conflict as tied to their own regime security, as well as their revolutionary legitimacy. And then, more broadly, governments throughout history have often accepted severe economic or military costs because backing down carried even greater political or symbolic costs. It’s not just a tit for tat or a binary choice between costs and interests.

I don’t mean to insinuate that conflict is inevitable in any way, and it doesn’t mean that deterrence can’t work. It just means that the United States has to recognize that the CCP may weigh costs differently than America would. Because Taiwan is bound up within that party’s legitimacy/identity, Beijing may be willing to accept costs that traditional deterrence models assume would be unacceptable for any other normal player. Understanding that difference doesn’t weaken deterrence, it actually makes it more realistic and, ultimately, more likely to succeed if certain measures are taken.

Host

Proponents claim that strategic ambiguity provides vital diplomatic flexibility, but you suggest that it might incentivize incremental Chinese aggression. Why do you believe Washington’s lack of clarity is being misread by Beijing as a sign of weakness or indecision?

Ziller

Thank you for that question. It’s very apropos to the topic. Strategic ambiguity has served the United States and policymakers for decades now, and there are good reasons why it was adopted in the first place. It gave, and continues to give, policymakers some level of flexibility and helps to discourage unilateral actions by either Beijing or Taipei. For Beijing, it discourages forceful unification, and for Taipei, it discourages unilateral independence or unilateral announcement of independence.

My argument isn’t that the United States should abandon ambiguity overnight but, rather that policymakers should ask whether the strategy is still producing the effects and the effects of the degree that the United States wants. The strategic environment has changed very dramatically since the policy was first adopted, so I think it’s time to kind of revisit the question of strategic ambiguity’s place within the deterrence relationship.

This reassessment is warranted. You know, just looking at some recent events (or relatively recent events)over the last several years, there’s been a steady increase in PLA (People’s Liberation Army) air and maritime activity around Taiwan. They’ve carried out larger exercises. They’ve participated in more coercive behavior and more gray-zone operations. To add some specifics to that, to put things in perspective, the PLA aircraft have entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (or ADIZ) roughly 1,700 times in 2023.

Just one year later, so in 2024, that number had climbed to more than 3,600. That’s not a small change. That’s a significant increase in operational tempo. If you’re sitting in Beijing [and] every year, you’re flying more and more aircraft around Taiwan, conducting larger exercises, and spending more time operating around the island, yet, nothing fundamentally changes about how the United States responds, at some point, I think it’s reasonable to ask whether you’re beginning to interpret the signals that you’re giving off differently than Washington intends. So, that’s really the question that I’m raising.

Another challenge with strategic ambiguity as a central pillar of deterrence policy is that flexibility for one side can sometimes look like uncertainty to the other. And, one of the central components of deterrence is how all parties, in the case of the three-way deterrence relationship that’s prevalent in the Taiwanese straits, is how everyone perceives each other and the actions that the participants—and the terms of the relationship—are given out. If an adversary isn’t confident about your intentions or your willingness to respond, there’s a greater chance they’ll test the boundaries incrementally rather than through a single dramatic action. That’s, I think, what we’ve been seeing in the last couple [of] years, as those statistics articulate.

Just a final thought on this question. Ultimately, that’s why I think signaling deserves as much attention as the military force posture. It’s not only about what capabilities the United States has. It’s about making sure their actions, diplomatic messaging, as well as military posture reinforce one another, rather than sending any sort of mixed signals or unclear messages.

The most effective deterrent signal isn’t a single military exercise or a single diplomatic statement issued at different points. It’s all of those instruments consistently communicating the same me...