In part two of this two-part episode, COL Kyle Marcrum and Dr. Jessica Liao discuss Taiwan President Lai’s special defense budget and the Kuomingdang Chair, Cheng Li-wun, visit to Beijing.
Keywords: Taiwan, defense, budget
COL Kyle Marcrum
Welcome back to the CLSC Dialogues, a production of the China Landpower Studies Center at the United States Army War College. The opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the speakers, and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, United States Army War College, or the US government. I'm Colonel Kyle Marcrum, director of the China Landpower Studies Center, and I'm again joined by Doctor Jessica Liao.
We are picking up part two of our conversation on President Lai’s special defense budget. Last time we ended with Jessica raising Cheng's visit to China. And I'm glad you raised Cheng’s visit to Beijing, Cheng Li-wun, the chair of the KMT, just traveled against this whole backdrop. And I want to emphasize that this is an ever-increasing complexity where we have Legislative Yuan, the president's trying to pass this special defense budget. The Legislative Yuan is split on it.
Dr. Jessica Liao
Yeah.
Marcrum
President Trump and General Secretary Xi Jinping are scheduled to meet. It was postponed. And then in the meantime, the KMT chair travels to Beijing and meets with Xi Jinping. What do you think was the objective of that visit?
Liao
Yeah.
There are several unique things, and also the objective that you talk about that is tied into this visit. Let’s start was like Cheng Li-wun herself. She's a very unique individual and like, you know, come from a very complex like political background. She actually started as the pro-independence movement player, like, you know, a part of the whole, like they call it Tangwai, the outside party alluding to KMT party, the movement, you know, before the Taiwan democracies. And so being the member of the DPP and then in 2005, she shifted from DPP to KMT. And in the recent years, she started to move into a very more of the pro-Beijing kind of stance within the whole KMT, like, you know, political candidates that was trying to jockeying for the new chairmanship.
And really, she's coming from nowhere. It's just like, you know, a couple months ago, like she suddenly like, you know, rise to the center. And the reason that she was able to rise up so quickly, a lot of people, you know, speculated that Beijing had helped, but we don't have direct evidence on that. But she does have a lot of support from especially those like pro-Beijing stance veterans who still want to see a unified China and have a more stronger ideational like, you know, convergence with Beijing. And it's kind of like, you know, pan-Chinese, kind of like, yeah, identities.
So those like, voters within KMTs are really like, you know, diehard supporters for Cheng Li-wun’s rise. And so she kind of like, just like, you know, shock everybody and then become the rising figures of this KMT chairman elections. So she went there. And it's very different from all the previous like KMT leaders to visit to Beijing.
So the last time that KMT leaders like, met with the Beijing leadership was like a decade ago, that was Ma Ying-jeou, who was already there, and long standing KMT leadership. So she is really brand new, doesn't really have that kind of like foundation, like what all her predecessors are when they were meeting with Beijing. So in that sense, Beijing is also taking a gamble on her, right? Because she does not have that kind of like, you know, solid foundations within her party, that she just took the leadership.
And on the other hand, because of this kind of like, complicated political background. I think the polls has showing that people, the public are not very, you know, trusting her political credential, like seeing her more as a, you know, a chameleon.
So, you know, and, but she want to make a point about William Lai’s approach is wrong. And instead, this kind of peaceful approach and a more pro-Beijing kind of stance is a way to go and to be able to seek a peaceful coexistence with Beijing.
Marcrum
Which is interesting because I don't know if you saw the AI video that's making its rounds on social media, where, Cheng is at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial and he comes to life and he's like, “All right, China's united?” And she's like, “No.” And so then Chiang Kai-shek goes and beats President Lai with his cane.
So it kind of it kind of goes behind this idea that, you know, a united China or she's part of this united China idea. But I also wanted to point out that, you know, she's like you said, she's new to the movement, or to the KMT, fairly new. But she met with Xi Jinping.
I believe it was the—and this is where I'm going to show my ignorance of anything that's outside of China and Taiwan—it was I believe it was the United Kingdom. Their prime minister went to China and Xi Jinping, did not meet with him. Was it was it the UK? I'll have to look that up. It was a European leader. It was UK or may have been. . . somebody went to China and did a tour of China, but Xi Jinping did not meet with them.
Liao
I think. Yeah, you are right. There is a European leader recently I believe is the yeah.
Marcrum
Believe it was UK.
Liao
Right, yeah.
Marcrum
But it's the idea that Xi Jinping, a, you know, a country that is like China that is very focused on protocol and a national leader comes and does not meet with Xi Jinping. Then at the same time, we have KMT, who is a political party in what China believes to be a breakaway province, travels, and Xi Jinping does meet with her.
So what idea was Xi Jinping trying to show? It becomes another question. One of the things I was also really curious about because Chen Li-wun, when she was in China, she mentioned the 92 Consensus multiple times.
Liao
That's right.
Marcrum
But when I was in Taiwan, it seemed like the, you know, the 92 non—what was it?—the non-consensus consensus, like people were saying.
So for people not familiar the 92 Consensus was that there was one China but kind of ambiguous on who runs it. Right? But then, so, but that became was becoming less popular, particularly with the youth in Taiwan who identify themselves as Taiwans or Taiwanese versus Chinese-Taiwan or Taiwan. So she, but she mentioned it multiple times. Was her, I mean, I guess it goes back to this unified China idea. Is she trying to identify more with that? Does she think that she can rally a KMT behind that, or what do you think she's trying to do with that?
Liao
Right.
So yeah, the KMT, the Nationalist Party and also CCP, the Chinese Communist Party, they went way back to like early 20th Century. So this party, like this two party have like a very long standing relationship that they, you know, coalesce throughout, you know, the before, before 1949 when the PRC was born. And they and they still tried to carry that kind of like tradition on to say like we are still in many ways, you know, all started from like Sun Yat-sen, who was the founder of the Nationalist Party, but also a big advocate to say, let's accommodate the Communist Party inside the party movement, because after all, we are all nationalists and we all want to see a unified China in front of the whole, you know, colonial pressures and so on.
So I think there is a long tradition ever since 2005, when the KMT chairman, then Lien Chan, you know, visited Beijing, they had that kind of historical connections in or imagination, if you will, to really try to revitalize that kind of like, you know, linkage, like nationalist linkage. And I think Cheng Li-wun’s trip was trying to like, carry that kind of like historical memory in order to like, you know, enhance her legitimacy. That she is the one that, you know, like, received the torch from her, you know, predecessors. And part of this kind of like, you know, tradition continuing is to reassert her support for the 92 Consensus.
And the 92 Consensus, of course, it started from 1992. That was basically the both sides have this like first official statement after the Cold War talking about, you know, we are all China, but whether you want to interpret it as the PRC China, People's Republic of China in Beijing or the ROC China, Republic of China in Taipei, that is a respected interpretation that both sides can do their own justification, and we are not going to pick on those.
So it's sort of like an unwritten political fudge that you, you know, you're giving the wiggling room for both sides to make it. So it's in many ways like very politically, you know, genius kind of arrangement. However, after Xi came into power as the CCP leadership, he is no longer a, you know, tolerating so much wiggling room. He's increasingly insisting on taking away the second part of the 92 Consensus. There is no respected interpretation of 92. China is one China, and that is the PRC China, and Taiwan is part of it.
So a lot of people believe that, you know, Cheng Li-wun during her trip, she also reiterated her insistence to go back to the 92 Consensus as the baseline for the both sides to start a dialog. But what is being dinged on by a lot of Taiwanese is that she is also staying away from reiterating the respected interpretation, like all the previous KMT officials do. So a lot of people believe that she is siding with, you know, Beijing on the different interpretation, kind of, is increasingly become the PRC-dominated interpretation.
Nonetheless, on the event of her visit to Sun Yat-sen’s memorial, she did spill out ROC Republic of China. But she say it in the way as like, you know, this is the history where the ROC was born, is right here. And that's why she is having this responsibility and respect to continue this kind of lineage. So it gives out like a mixed message. And we don't really know what [her] motivation is. But you know, everybody can speculate. The whole trip is very carefully like, you know, worded and choreographing by both sides.
Marcrum
Yeah.
Liao
So like I think a lot of people believe this kind of mixed message is like intended to be to, to please both sides. But I think the important message there is that she wants to she, she wants to send out, you know, to Taipei that we're still insisting to 92 Consensus. Nothing is changing. But on the other hand, she wants to please her host that we are seeing, and she did mention a few times that, you know, both KMT and CCP are going to work towards this so-called the China's reunification rejuvenation. That is basically, you know, the top line of the party is like a political objective towards the island.
Marcrum
Well, so. Before I pull it back to the budget, I just wanted to check to see if you had anything else you wanted to talk about with her visit.
Liao
I think another thing that's like, kind of stood out for me in terms of the messaging is that, well, so like, yeah, she is totally, she is basically following a lot of the CCP party line on unification and also peaceful, you know, approach and, and also pledge that.
Oh yeah, another thing, I think two things of the messaging that stood out to me is like this increasingly like separated like stance that she is, she is calling out for. First she's calling, you know, she's alluding to Washington as a catalyzer of the conflict. And, you know, this kind of like, you know, warmongering and also trying to exploit the differences between both sides. And on the other hand, she even and this is the first time that a KMT chair actually emphasizing on Japanese colonial influence as the key factor of Taiwan's current pro-independence movement.
Marcrum
Wow.
Liao
Yeah. So this is this is also very much in line with CCP's propaganda. So you can see that kind of like, you know, waging between like Taiwan and also allies is definitely being reverberated from her trip.
Marcrum
And this is coming on the heels of Japan saying that Taiwan is a, you know, a—
Liao
If there is a Taiwan crisis.
Marcrum
Yeah. That they would. So it's, you know, Japan saying borderline saying that they would be involved.
Liao
That's right.
Marcrum
And it becomes on the heels of that, she says that, you know, starts bringing up this colonial influence. That's very interesting. Kind of definitely shows a pivot. I'm wondering if, you know, Taiwan's next presidential elections 2028. I'm wondering if she is trying to either position or I mean, of course I'd have to look up if there's local elections. I'm sure there's local elections between them.
Liao
November. Yeah.
Marcrum
November. So I'm wondering if she's trying to—one of the things we talked about after President Lai won the election was that this was, you know, typically although let's say typically with a heavy caveat, typically in Taiwan, they flip back and forth between parties. And this was the first time that we went from President Tsai to President Lai, same political party.
Liao
That's right.
Marcrum
Again, heavy caveat: They've only done this a few times, right? So when you have that kind of that, it was okay, the KMT has to reinvent itself. But then, you know, the KMT was searching for an identity. But then they won in a recall election overwhelmingly. And so do they really need to reinvent themselves or do they just need to go back to their roots? And maybe she's just saying, hey, we just need to go back to our roots, and that's what's going to help us be successful.
The DPP has famously taken on other movements like the Sunflower Movement, they brought a lot of those people in, which was a youth movement, about feeling that they were getting too close to the CCP or to the Chinese.
So it's very interesting. We could talk all day about politics, obviously, particularly Taiwan politics, it’s so complicated. But I do want to bring it back to the defense budget as we wrap up here in the last few minutes. So when we're talking about Taiwan's defense budget, what do you think? What do you think we're going to see next? This special budget, we got the United States pressuring both the senators, retired admirals telling saying, hey, you need to get this through. President Lai wants to get it through. The KMT seems to be a little split. Do you think, what do you think's going to happen next?
Liao
I think a few factors are coming. The immediate one is the summit between Washington and Beijing in May.
Marcrum
Yeah.
Liao
Well. Yeah, let's not forget that it's not just, you know, the hiccup is not just on the Taipei side, Washington’s side as well, since we postpone the arms sales deal for this visit, right? So we want to have this kind of, like, all good environment before the summit takes place. So we don't really know, like how the deal and the, you know, the conversations about the Taiwan issue will pan out from the visit, and how much would that affect the perception from Taipei. I think that is something that’s worthwhile watching.
And if the, if President Trump and President Xi has a more, you know, different kind of positions on Taiwan, especially on how much, you know, like Washington can sell, it can continue the arm sales to, to Taipei, then bolster William Lai’s position, say see United States have more you know willingness to actually side with us to help defend and therefore this like arms sales deal will be well spent.
But if on the other hand, they basically talking about like, you know, if President Trump talking about, well this is an internal affair, we're not going to intervene. This arm sales will probably will have to like hold it for the indefinite time. Then it really helps justify KMT's opposition to this arms sale. That is like basically, you know, the lack of willingness for Washington to side with us, we don't really know if this long-spending budget will actually, you know, pay back in return of the security guarantee. So there might be this kind of complication.
But I think the second and probably more important factor in dynamic is the, the year-end election. Because we're talking about—so even within KMT, I think there is a split between how much they should please Beijing or how much they should play this kind of balance game between Washington and Beijing.
And I would say, going back to Cheng's background, she is a dark horse, and she is not the kind of like mainstream voice for a long time. So we don't really know if she is able to, you know, under her leadership, will KMT be able to win the midterm election in November this year? And if she could then carry, you know, enough vote and to show to the public that under her leadership, KMT is able to pivot to a new direction and still be able to woo the voters, then she will fail her leadership and she will be a short lived, probably the shortest lived like leadership that have ever met with President Xi.
So in some way, Beijing is taking a gamble on her. Yeah. If she lost the election in November, then basically KMT is likely to move back to a more moderate stance that is like, you know, more of the balanced approach between Beijing and also Washington. And don't forget, there are a lot of the more senior leadership within the KMT that has a long ties to Washington as well, such as Lu Shiow-yen, who was who was a Taichung mayor. And also a lot of people speculate that she is the top, you know, running candidate for the presidential election in 2028. And she visited Washington recently. And her version of the arms sales budget is actually higher than the official budget that KMT proposed to, you know, to contest with DPP's version.
So a lot of people believe that even within KMT, there is a split between how much arms sales, you know, is deemed as justified. So we don't really know if KMT, if Cheng Li-wun under KMT is going to sustain this kind of like hardline positions against the KMT budget, against the arms sales budget.
Marcrum
And I want to offer maybe a—I'm big on pre-mortems. Right. So our prediction is that the, if Trump and Xi’s summit or the KMT split, you know, these are the things that are going to influence the budget. What if we're wrong? What would what would us being wrong look like? What's a dark horse that could influence the budget or what's an alternate perspective maybe. Not to put you on the spot in the last five minutes.
Liao
It is. Yeah. So what have we all got wrong about it?
Marcrum
What's—
Liao
What is it? Yeah. Give me a scenario. Yeah, a concrete scenario. Like what exactly are you thinking about like that is the wrong? Kind of—
Marcrum
So what if what if there's no, like, KMT—in what you offered the KMT had kind of alternate versions of the budget. What if this, just the TPP comes out of nowhere and the TPP, I guess we should focus on the TPP has got to is struggling with identity themselves, with Ko Wen-je going to jail.
Liao
Right.
Marcrum
And now as a you know, they were very much a party that was him. And so now that he's gone how do they survive? Now they've got a new a new leader who seems to be kind of forward leaning and other things like that.
Liao
Right.
Marcrum
So. Okay. TPP wants to make themselves a real political party. They come out and they're going to stake their claim. Alternate, I'm just—this is a hypothetical reality—they're going to stake their claim on no defense budget.
Liao
Right.
Marcrum
And the whole thing just gets shut down. What would we see going into that kind of reality? Or even, let's say, the other end of it at TPP, I'm just kind of putting the TPP as they were the kingmaker. We haven't talked a lot about them. What if they come out and fully enforce behind this budget? What if they decide that the 92 Consensus is, you know, is a dead issue? That's a that's a landmine they don't want to touch. We're going to go full with defense spending. What would we see running into either of those versions?
Liao
Right It's I would say the gray area is so vast now that and like you say, TPP at this phase is really struggling with its own internal dynamic and also its own party platform, especially on what is a consensus of this, you know, arms sales, even though they are always focusing on the lean budget and also government efficiency and all that. And they see a lot of this arms sales, especially $40 billion, is a huge deal. And they deem us more of the budgetary waste. But I think Ko Wen-je, you know, given his own political struggle, like mired in corruption allegations or prosecutions, a lot of people also, and even within TPP, a lot of people are actually, you know, trying to like, yeah cut ties from it and become independent now. And if you look at the recent polling, [Academia] Sinica Taiwan, which is like the, you know, like, the think tank and also the research institute in Taiwan. They did this recent polling within the Taiwanese voters about their perceptions on arms sales. And really interestingly, that is very like, you know, basically like aligned pretty well with the Partisanship. Of course, all the TPP voters are like, you know, they like phenomenally high- level supporting this arms sales, like almost like 96 plus percent, they support the arms sales. And KMT on the other end is only like 40 something 45 [percent] support the arms sales. The really interesting part is the TPP voters, they're actually sitting in between. About 60% of the TTP voters actually support arms sales.
Marcrum
Interesting.
Liao
Yeah. So that is saying that as long as you justify this well, and then there is also BBC doing like an interview on, you know, kind of like random interviews of like people's perception after Cheng Li-wun’s visit to Beijing asking young voters like, what do they see about that? A lot of people, you know, not responding well or a lot of people just like responding as like, well, we of course we know what she's going to say, really doesn't make that much difference of my perception of understanding the need or lack thereof about the arms sale deal.
But I think that a lot of the perception and all this kind of like, you know what, if we are wrong, it really depends on Beijing's continued response and approach to Taiwan. Right? If Beijing is still showing that they're very hostile and they are not willing to give up the military invasion and approach to Taiwan, I think it just automatically let the voters, you know, believe that the arms sales is necessary.
And what we are seeing very cleverly from Beijing is that they are releasing a lot of good wills, trying to reopen, you know, like the Cross Strait tourists visit and also, you know, more buying of the Taiwanese agricultural products and all those very typical economic statecraft kind of approach. And they are hoping to swaying voters’, you know, support and try to help, you know, give a leg to Cheng Li-wun to gently when to boost her, you know, credibility.
Marcrum
But this is you know, it's interesting because at the same time, Beijing is doing things like these Joint sword exercises where they are really pressuring, continuing to increase the pressure on Taiwan, which kind of goes against that, you know, we can negotiate through this as well. I'm preparing, you know. Admiral Paparo said that they were rehearsals for an invasion. So it's the idea that they're pressuring Taiwan is counter to the we can talk this out and we're going to increase trade.
So, you know, I would be remiss without saying that this is a dialectic that China is very comfortable with.
Liao
Yeah.
Marcrum
Well, Jessica, thanks for coming on. I know we've gone a little over and we only have five more pages of things we wanted to talk about. So we'll have to do this again. So thank you very much for coming.
Liao
Absolutely.
Marcrum
Listeners, if you have any feedback on what things you'd like Jessica and I to talk about, reach out to us on the CLSC website. My email is on there. And let us know how we can better talk about Taiwan or other issues you want us to talk about.
Thank you very much for joining me again, Jessica.
Liao
Thank you.
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