CLSC Dialogues – Ep 29 – Tom Spahr and General Xavier Brunson – “An Enviable Position in the Pacific”: An interview with General Xavier Brunson

Guest host Tom Spahr and General Xavier Brunson, commander of United Nations Command, ROK-US Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea (UNC/CFC/USFK), discuss Korea, the Indo-Pacific, and mission command.

Keywords: Korea, China, mission command

Dr. Tom Spahr (Host)

Welcome to CLSC Dialogues, a production of the China Landpower Studies at the US Army War College. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or the Department of War. I’m Dr. Tom Spahr, the Francis De Serio Chair of Strategic and Theater Intelligence here at the Army War College and your host for today’s conversation.

This time each year, the Army War College hosts the Army’s annual Strategic Landpower Symposium to encourage professional dialogue on the role of Landpower in modern warfare. The keynote speaker for this year’s symposium is General Xavier Brunson, the commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea, the so-called Tri-Command.

We are fortunate to have General Brunson with us today in the CLSC Dialogues studio. Before assuming command in December of 2024, General Brunson commanded at every subordinate level, including the US Army’s First Corps. Before that, the Army’s 7th Infantry Division, both focused on the Indo-Pacific theater. At the brigade level, he commanded the 525 Battlefield Surveillance Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

General Brunson is also a proud graduate of the US Army War College. General Brunson, welcome back to Carlisle Barracks, and thank you for joining us today on CLSC Dialogues.

General Xavier Brunson

Dr. Spahr, Tom, it’s it’s great to be with you again and thank you for the opportunity.

Spahr

So, sir, we had the opportunity to speak last year around this time. We did that one on A Better Peace, of the War Room podcast, and I’ll just refer listeners to that if they want more. But, I think it will be beneficial for listeners of this podcast to start with just a description of your command, the Tri-Command, as we call it in Korea. It is unique. And, can you just briefly describe why why it’s a tri-command and how that works?

Brunson

Yeah. You know, it’s interesting as you list out the commands that are the three that are that make up my job. It almost follows the way things would if something broke out. So, you have the United Nations Command, which maintains the armistice that’s truthfully at the front. And should the armistice fail, then you have the Combined Forces Command, which is the ROK-US alliance, and then you have United States Forces Korea, which is a representation of the US’s will to enforce, support, sustain a mutual defense treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States.

It’s a Joint command. I’ve got a space component, a SOF component. I’ve got an air component, a maritime component. I’ve got a marine component and a land component represented by the only forward station field army in the United States military. So Eighth Army, so that’s what it is and how it functions is it functions as an example. For 75 years, it has stood in one shape, way, or form. And, I think that’s important.

Spahr

Now that’s great sir. It’s for the Army War College. You hit the Joint command. You are the only field army right in the in the in the US inventory. Let’s let’s jump into deterrence, though. So, when we talk about deterrence in the Pacific, that conversation, it also often gravitates towards naval and air capabilities because there’s a lot of blue on the on the map there. But you’re here for the Strategic Landpower Symposium. So, will you explain the role of persistent land-based presence specifically in Korea? And, how does Landpower on the Korean Peninsula deter in ways that the other domains just can’t?

Brunson

Yeah, I think that’s, you know, in my remarks today to the class, one of the things I talked about is Operation Epic Fury is taking advantage of things we’ve already done, particularly in Landpower, to set theaters. If you think about the bases that we’re utilizing right now, those are on ground that was seized by Landpower to establish those bases in much the same in Korea.

When you look at our US Army bases that are forward, where you have Landpower forward positioned, I think a thing that we have to start talking about is what is credible. Do we have credible capabilities forward on that land? And, the United States Army is in an enviable position, more so than other services to have enviable Landpower stationed where it might act in the theater or, if nothing else, provides opportunities for our adversaries to say, maybe not today.

And then, when you look across the region, there’s this woven network of Landpower that exists across the Pacific, that it’s the glue that holds it all together. When you look at 10 of the world’s largest armies, four to five of them sit in the Indo-Pacific, three of them are treaty allies. Those forces are led by army generals. And, those army generals tie that Landpower network together in a way that you will see nowhere else.

Spahr

Many of them graduates of the Army War College.

Brunson

Absolutely. They’re all there in the Hall of Fame.

But, I think that that we oftentimes and as I mentioned to the class as well, we don’t have to give ourselves credit for doing this, but we ought to at least acknowledge that Landpower is the difference for other forces.

Spahr

Yes, sir. I couldn’t agree more. Here at the Army War College. You know, we talk a lot about strategic empathy or the task of understanding the enemy’s perspective. You challenged the audience today in your keynote address to view the competition in the Pacific East up by turning that map 90 degrees to the right, placing Korea right in the middle. And, then envisioning the theater from China’s perspective, can you describe what that perspective reveals to you?

Brunson

Yeah, Tom, you know, it’s it’s amazing when you look at it the other way. Like, I was always one of these people that was like, what are they so concerned about? There’s all kinds of gaps in those islands that they could just drive through, and they don’t have any problem with access to the greater Pacific. Well, they do in their mind, because of capabilities that might be resident on those landmasses and how it might impact their ability to transit smoothly.

And so, when they when they look out from from the east coast of China, what they see is there’s Korea, the dagger in the heart of Asia, there’s Japan again, sort of that shield that’s sort of a backstop, if you will, for them trying and their ambitions beyond that into the South China Sea and then down to their southeast is the Philippines.

And, when you start thinking about things that have been done, like Typhon missiles being in the Philippines, that shuts that area down, you know, there are risks that that they have to take on. But by the same token, we have to kind of look at ourselves and say, well, we’re in a pretty good position right now. You know, you’ve got that triangle that’s together. And, if we can sew that up into a kill web, if we can communicate, if we can see, sense, and understand the right way, what that’s going to provide for us is maybe to never have to go to war, because there’s there’s this palpable thing that exists there in alliance that they just can’t defeat. Now we are able to move into diplomacy. Now we’re able to have economic freedom. Maybe the Indo-Pacific does remain free and open because of just how real that threat could be to an adversary. And, and I think, though, that it starts with looking out and seeing what they see and understanding what they might take exception to and why. It wasn’t the fact that a capability was in the Philippines. It’s what that capability could do that placed them at, you know, considering that to be a threat.

Spahr

So, I want to come back a little bit to the allies and partners, but you trigger me on something there. When you mentioned kill web, you hear that term more and more. Now, what do you mean by a kill web?

Brunson

A web has different anchor points, a kill chain. I just imagine this chain link, this, you know, something that you would lock your bike up with. It’s got a beginning. It’s got an end. You bring it around, you throw a lock on it. The kill web requires others to be a part of it so that you can achieve enviable effects.

Right? You might not be the best sensor. You might not be able to see best. You might not be able to sense best. You might not even be able to act decisively. But, that net brings together a lot of things, right? It changes magazine depth because you can use a variety of different shooters. It changes the way that we understand our operating environment.

It changes the shape of the operating environment. It could morph because we’re not just anchored to a single point. We’re developing this web. There’s efficiencies in that as well. And, I don’t know that we ever think about efficiency and combat, but there are efficiencies there and that you don’t have to do it all by yourself. And, it’s also very phalanx-like, because now we’re standing with someone else to achieve the effect we’re after for those allies and partners.

Spahr

Come into that you talk about. And it’s funny, no matter, you know, no matter what political party’s in power in our country, they all consistently emphasize that importance of the allies and the partners. And, you talk about the strategic triangle there of Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Is there anything else you want to elaborate on on the importance of those countries?

Brunson

Well, I think that what we find is, is that yo...